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THE NGO-ISATION DILEMMA: INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION, GRASSROOTS RELATIONS,
AND GOVERNMENT ACTION FROM AN
ACCOUNTABILITY PERSPECTIVE
A Case Study of Colombian Migration NGOs and the
National System of Migration
LINA BUCHELYt
Abstract: This paper summarizes the results of a case study
examining policy advocacy activities developed by the Fundaci6n
Esperanza (Hope Foundation) and the Plataforma Social HERMES
(HERMES Social Platform) in support of Colombian Draft Law
070 of 2009 (creation of a National System for Migration and other
regulations). It maps the actors and interests involved in efforts
taking place between February and May 2010 to promote public
policy in the field. The conclusion drawn from this research is that
there are at least three ways of highlighting the relationships
between civil society actors, government servants, grassroots and
international cooperation agencies in the field of migration: (1)
instrumentalization
(between
NGOs
and
International
Cooperation), (2) complementarity and capture (between NGOs
and local government), and (3) impersonation (between NGOs and
migrant population). The paper ends by presenting these three
principal reflections within the framework of Migration NGOs'
accountability, an issue described as a challenge in the current law
and development literature.
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INTRODUCTION

Are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) good
mediators between government decision-makers and civil society?
Is it wrong to accuse them of bureaucracy and financial
motivation? Why should it be a surprise that NGOs neither
"represent" the migrant population nor have a social base? Do
migrants even know what they want? Should NGOs be allowed to
operate as networks or elites that seek simply to maximize their
own benefit? This article discusses the role of migration implicated
NGOs in Colombia through a case study that examines policy
advocacy activities developed by the Fundaci6n Esperanza (Hope
Foundation) and the Plataforma Social HERMES (HERMES
Social Platform) in support of Colombian Draft Law 070 of 2009
(for the creation of a National System for Migration, and other
regulations). Through the case study, this paper will analyze the
field of Migration NGOs' accountability by framing the
interactions of three different levels of Migration NGOs: (1) the
international cooperation level (relations between NGOs and
Cooperation Agencies), (2) the state level (relations between the
NGOs and local government), and (3) the civil society level
(relations between NGOs and migrants). This approach exposes a
hidden absence of accountability in the development sector
wherein NGOs do not always deliver what they promise, and yet
no one notices. Thus, this paper serves to fill the gap in existing
migration literature regarding the accountability of civil society
organizations that speak on behalf of the migrant population.
The international migration phenomenon has been studied
extensively in Colombia since 1980.1 The international migration
caused by economic issues, which is a specific kind of human
mobilization better known as labor migration, has occurred in three
main stages. 2 The first wave began in 1960, and the first
destination was the United States. The second wave occurred
' Ministerio del Interior, Conpes Doc. 3603 (2009), http://en.calameo.com/read/
000251088ad3efM8c7263.
2
id
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between 1980 and 1989, and its primary receptor country was
Venezuela.3 The third wave started in 1990 and focused mainly on
Spain.4 Currently, the National Department of Statistics (DANE)
reports that over three million people of Colombian origin live in
other countries, representing 6.5% of the total population. The
money spent by these individuals represents approximately 3.3%
of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the last decade and was
mainly used for consumer goods and services, rather than savings
or investments.6 Beyond these numbers, public documents that
track migration issues highlight the difficulties of working with
this kind of population.7 These workers almost never report the
circumstances of their statuses because the majority of labor
emigration takes place under illegal conditions in the receptor
context. Given this fact, it is almost impossible talk about
international migrants.
What is unusual about approaching Colombian
international migrants, however, is that they are publicly
represented by a broad array of civil society organizations that
purport to speak on their behalf. Any initial approach into the
world of the migrant is, therefore, mediated by a broad swathe of
NGOs that have established a solid presence in the relevant
research arena. The work programs of these NGOs are heavily
weighted towards policy advocacy, and their employees often end
up being experts in public policy and lobbying strategies,
3id.
4

Libr. of Cong. Fed. Research Div., Colombia: A Country Study, 98 (Rex A.
Hudson ed., 5t" ed. (2010), http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/pdf/CSColombia.pdf.
6 William Mejia et al., Encuesta Nacional 2008-2009: Resultados Generales de
Migraciones Internacionales y Remesas, (2009), http://observatoriodemigracion
es.org/apc-aa-files/978114efl2eOae35ebl362dala8ce38f/Analisis Encuesta.pdf.
7 Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores Direccion de Asuntos Consulares y
Comunidades Colombianas en el Exterior, Lineaminentos para la Politica
Integralde Migraciones,(2008), http://www.opalc.org/images/MIGP/colombia
%201ineamientospim-final-junio I32008.pdf.
8

id.
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deploying national strategies on behalf the international migrants
outside the state. This also points to the fact that, despite
international migrants having important problems of visibility in
the international context, these migrants are represented by many
NGOs at the domestic level, leading to a question about the
accountability of migration NGOs and their real relationship with
the population they claim to represent. This article tries to address
this problem.
In concrete terms, this paper analyzes NGOs' migrations
that are currently mobilized at the local level in order to create a
National System of Migration. This NGO mobilization is highly
controversial because it destroyed earlier agreements among the
people from academia and civil society who advocated for
international migration by indicating that the struggle should be
outside the boundaries of the nation state and proposing a way to
live in a post-national regime. Under that premise, the question is:
why do the people who work to protect the migrant population
concentrate on having more state involvement, when the prior
focus of their efforts was to reject the perverse system of nation
states that created borders, exclusive territories, and unique bodies
of citizens and to persecute any attempt to escape from these
confines? In a sense, the scripts that established the "requirement
that the state should take responsibility by developing an integrated
government policy on migrants" 9 and the "obligation of the state to
return to migrants their participation in development by reinvesting
their remittances" 10 ended up being contradictory, given the fact
that it is feasible for border controls and limits to mobility to be
abolished. 1

9 PLATAFORMA SOCIAL HERMES, OFFICIAL DECLARATION (Colom.).
10 Id.

1 In fact, a large part of the international movement in favor of migrants
promotes the idea that border restrictions should be abolished. Instead, a new
notion of an international citizenship that does not correspond to established
territories should be established. See Iker Barbero, Ciudadania y Migraciones.
Hacia nuevos Pluralismos Juridicos, http://www.hegoa.ehu.es/congreso/bilbo/ko
mu/3 Participacion/2_lker-Barbero.pdf.
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The initial question concerning the shift in migration
mobilization from the international perspective to the struggle for
the National System of Migration proposed an exploration that
was, to some, contradictory: namely, the situation immigrants find
themselves in and its intimate relationship with the contemporary
deployment of domestic policy. The question was contradictory
because reliance on domestic control mechanisms would lead to a
strengthening of the system of border controls and the regulations
governing the status of the citizenry-resulting in scenarios where
migrants are defined as "dangerous." 2 Immigrants are subjected to
controls created by the national system that are put in place to
contain the population, establishing an equation of exclusion
involving citizens, the legal system, and the territory. This system
is activated whenever there is a danger that frontiers may be
crossed. If individuals find themselves outside the system, they are
automatically excluded from all mechanisms of protection.' 3
Hence, the preliminary tension between the international
and the domestic frame for the migrant mobilization leads to an
issue of Migration NGOs accountability. A reconstruction mapping
the principal actors suggests that an international agenda to
advocate for the interests of the international migration receptor
countries (as EEUU and EU) in an economic crisis context was
constructed in order to promote a "return" from the international
arena to migrants' origin countries. In this sense, my analysis maps
social and state actors at the domestic level, as well as those
networks mobilized at the international level to provide evidence
12id.
" This phenomenon is manifested in the history of human rights. Specifically,
the Nazis called the refugees of the Second World War, "people without a
state." This expression also supports the Agamben reference to the "Homo
Sacer" and the "right to have rights" in Hannah Arendt's political philosophy.
See generally, LELAND DE LA DURANTAYE, GIORGOo AGAMBEN: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION, 200-323, 335-65 (2009) (discussing Agamben's philosophy of
"Homo Sacer"), and PEG BIRMINGHAM, HANNAH ARENDT & HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE PREDICAMENT OF COMMON RESPONSIBILITY (2006) (discussing) Arendt's
philosophy of the "right to have rights").
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of the real purposes of the "return" agenda and the legal promotion
of the National System of Migration. As an analysis of the results
shows, this case study provides information about how
international cooperation promotes funding for NGO migrations in
Colombia in order to discourage labor migration to other countries.
This work can be perceived as a contribution to the
migration field on three levels. First, the project is a contribution to
the analysis of civil society organizations that, while initially
responding to the classic division between society and state, end up
posing as representatives of the former. In the current context of
social mobilization, NGOs are highly politicized actors that pose a
serious challenge to the old politics of parties. They represent,
instead, new channels of communication between the public and
the private. By taking on a new "human" face, they establish
themselves as unique and highly specialized bodies dedicated to
capturing the resources of international cooperation agencies and
penetrating the national structures of power, while preserving their
lineage as purely private networks of interests and action.
Second, the project highlights NGOs' development of a
particular approach to the question of the migrant as the "other,"
creating a category in which the "other" is almost by definition
obliged to be invisible in order to survive, and about whom little is
known. This is a big challenge in terms of representation and NGO
accountability. Even though the forms of social mobilization
associated with NGOs claim to speak in the name of migrants and

to recognize the complexity inherent in defining them, activism for
migrant rights has been converted into a standard compendium of
petitions and steps designed to provide "protection" according to
their needs, their desires, and their struggles. This approach to
protection becomes an exercise in domination, defining and
representing migrants as subjects in need of protection, since their
"otherness" renders them entirely incapable of speaking.
Third, the project emphasizes certain aspects of the
underlying political realities of migratory movements, also worthy
of note. The Colombian government claims that civil society is

2012-2013
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subversive and communist, 14 while civil society qualifies the
Foreign Ministry as miserly and inhumane because its focus on
migration is dominated by the question of remittances and other
economic questions.15 In a parallel stage of the debate, other
sectors of civil society accuse Migration NGOs of playing into the
hands
of
international
cooperation-these
agencies
overwhelmingly represent governments that receive migrants and
are thus concerned with ensuring that migrant-producing countries'
governments are the ones who have to "deal with" migrant
populations. 16 Migration NGOs that engage in policy advocacy
activities defend themselves by employing hallowed liberal
arguments. Specifically, Migration NGOs argue that the state has
sole responsibility for the distribution of rights, that only the state
can guarantee benefits to the population or counteract the
distortions caused by remittances, and that international spaces
have failed to fulfill their promises to provide protection and this
has led to a return and consolidation of the role of the state.' 7
Therefore, this case study analysis also maps the national debate
and ideological interests within the migration debate.
Having established this cursory panorama, the article
concludes by emphasizing the evolution of three key relationships
between Migration NGOs and actors involved in the field. These
overlapping relations enable NGOs to instrumentalize,
complement, and capture and impersonate while bargaining with
(1) international cooperation agencies, (2) local government and
bureaucracies, and (3) migrant grassroots.
At the first level, civil society organizations working in the
field of migration create an instrumentalizingrelationshipvis d vis
14 Interview

with Ximena Botero, Dir., Colom. nos Une [United for Colom.], in
Agency of Foreign Affairs in Colom. (Mar. 23, 2010).
15 Interview with Nidia Tarazona, CGT Rep., Plataforma Social
Hermes (Apr.
21, 2010).
16 Letter from Colombianos en el Exterior Organization,
to Dario Angarita,
Senator (Nov. 22, 2009).
1 Interview with William Mejia, Dir. Alma Mater Network
(Apr. 13, 2010).
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the international cooperation bodies that finance them. The
objectives of Migration NGOs may be seen as, in fact, belonging
to these international cooperation agencies. The agencies seek to
use NGOs to reproduce certain forms of post-colonial domination
in the underdeveloped world and to contain migratory flows
without sacrificing the political structures that benefit them as
hegemonic states. In this way, actions developed by civil society to
strengthen the state are of fundamental importance to the receptor
societies. There are three reasons for this: first, such NGOs serve
to stem the flow of human beings or to stabilize existing
mechanisms (such as the right not to migrate and returnee
programs); second, the onus is placed on the migrant-producing
countries to protect their fleeing or stateless populations through a
focus on the distribution and protection of migrants' rights; and
third, their domination by the receptor states is legitimized under
the cover of a new ideological rhetoric of solidarity and economic
cooperation." Beneath the facade of the disinterested investment
of resources, not only do migration models reproduce existing
hierarchies of power, but the guilty conscience that results from the
mistreatment of immigrants in their own territories is assuaged,
allowing the developed states to perpetuate the myth that they are
"generous and altruistic" according to the universal schemes of
development promulgated by Development NGOs.19
At the second level, Migration NGOs develop a
complementary relationship when civil society organizations are
able to place their members as government "advisors" or "experts"
contracted to provide their perspectives as true "representatives" of
civil society on matters of urgent national interest. However, at the
same time and also in relation to the government, NGOs entertain a
relationshipof capture by establishing a network of projects that
they use as a strategy of penetration, placing their own members in
the bureaucracy. This allows NGOs to then control government
" See generally Islah Jad, NGOs: Between Buzzwords and Social Movements,
17 DEV. INPRACTICE 622 (2007).
19 Mar

Moroll6n, Cooperaci6ninternacional:encuentrosy desencuentros, in En
Pie de Paz, no 51, December 1999.
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resources and become an elite power rather than an authentic voice
of the population they claim to protect. In concrete terms, the
accusation is that NGOs seek to benefit by placing employees
within the bureaucracies, contracts, subsidies, and rights to
generate resources that they then reinvest in their own networks
rather than channeling into protection for others.
Finally, at the last level, NGOs generate impersonation
relations by positioning views that represent opposing attitudes
towards the situation of the migrant population. In this sense,
nobody has accurate information about the migrant population, but
everyone claims to speak on their behalf. Immigrants are a
complex group that is difficult to represent for geographical,
economical, and political reasons. Thus, the third focus of this
research involves the development of possible tensions between
immigrants as trans-border subjects and domestic strategies
embodied by the Migration NGOs that represent them.
This article aims to describe and analyze this three level
panorama of actors and relationships, schematized below:
Actors
NGOs

International
Cooperation
Local Government

Relationship
Instrumentalization
Complementarity
and

Migrants

capture

Impersonation

Table I- Map of actors and relationships

Considering the issue in this context, this article argues that
Migration NGOs in Colombia face accountability challenges on
three levels: (1) in their relationships with donors, (2) in their
relationships with the state, and (3) in their relationships with their
beneficiaries. In each of these levels, the dynamics of
instrumentalization,
complementarities
and capture,
and
impersonation are analyzed to describe the main challenges
confronting the development sector in the post-Washington
Consensus Era. This analysis coincides with current literature in
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the development field that also calls for an improvement in NGOs'
accountability.
With this goal in mind, the remainder of this article is
divided into four parts. The first section presents a review of
scholarly literature shaping current debates over NGOs in terms of
performance perceptions and accountability. The second section
addresses methodological issues and explains how the case study
of the Migration NGOs in Colombia was constructed. The third
section analyzes the results by applying a theoretical frame to the
main findings in the case study. Finally, the fourth section of the
article proposes some solutions to the lack of accountability in the
development sector and highlights the main findings of the work.
II.

ARE THE NGOS GOOD OR BAD?
LITERATURE REVIEW SECTION

The social perception of NGOs is one of the flashpoint
debates of current times. The last episode of the controversy
starred the video KONY 2012 and the interpretation by an NGO,
known as "Invisible Children," of the political and social conflicts
in Uganda. This video was very popular on social networks but
was highly criticized by local analysts who saw the NGO's
interpretation as delocalized, fake, and biased.2 0 In some ways, this
debate exemplifies why the accountability of NGOs has become
important over the last few years.
What role do the NGOs play in circumstances like
Uganda's? The end of the Cold War and the expansion of the
neoliberal agenda from the developed world to the developing
world have induced an incredible expansion of the NGO
structure. 21 Today, NGO agents are important voices in gender,
environmental, human rights, and other essential social issues.
20

Michael Deibert, The Problem With Invisible Children's "Kony 2012," THE

HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-deib

ert/joseph-kony-2012-children b 1327417.html.
21 Maxine Molyneux, The 'Neoliberal Turn' andthe New Social
Policy in Latin
America: How Neoliberal, How New?, 39(5) DEV. & CHANGE 775, 788-89
(2008).
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Additionally, NGOs are an important factor in the current political
arena because they are the "global civil society representatives."2 2
Moreover, NGOs are the rock stars of the new globalized
era, and many social mechanisms strengthen their image as good,
kind, and benign actors.23 NGOs have put together a large number
of
well-perceived
figures:
Nobel
Prize
recipients,
environmentalists, activists, singers, scholars, philanthropists, and
a variety of other figures with non-governmental, nonbureaucratic, uncorrupted images.24 In line with this trend, Kofi
Annan called NGOs a "global people power" at the Civil Society
Conference in 1999.25 After that, during the NGO Millennium
Forum in 2000, Annan also said, "[NGOs] brings to life the
concept of 'We, the Peoples' in whose name our United Nations
Charter was written." 26
However, at the same time, many social actors and scholars
have shown the biases behind these optimistic images.2 7 As with
the KONY 2012 video, the legitimacy and good will of the
transnational, international, Northern and Southern NGOs has
become a big question mark in the development policy arena and
the academic arena. The questions are: to what extent should
NGOs be seen as the "representatives" of the world's peoples; to
what extent do NGOs actually represent their voices; and what
Andrew Rehfeld, Towards a General Theory of PoliticalRepresentation, 68
THE J. OF POLS. 1, 9-10 (Feb. 2006).
23 Paul Nelson, Heroism andAmbiguity: NGO Advocacy
in InternationalPolicy,
10:3-4 DEV. IN PRAC. 478, 483.
24 Kenneth Anderson, Recent Books on InternationalLaw:
Review Essay: What
NGO Accountability Means And Does Not Mean: NGO Accountability:
Politics, Principles & Innovations, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 170-78 (2009)
(reviewing PETER VAN TUIJL & LISA JORDAN, NGO ACCOUNTABILITY:
POLITICS, PRINCIPLES & INNOVATIONS (2006)).
25 Id
22

26

27

See e.g.,

DOROTHY

L.

IODGSON, GENDER AND CULTURE AT THE LIMIT OF
ANDREA CORNWALL ET AL., GENDER MYTHS AND FEMINIST
STRUGGLE FOR INTERPRETATIVE POWER IN GENDER AND

RIGHTS (2011);
FABLES: THE
DEVELOPMENT 1- 18

(2008).
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kind of exclusions exist when we begin to equate civil society and
NGOs. 28 Next, we must figure out how to address the
accountability process of the third sector. This entails a number of
paradoxes: such organizations often lack consumer accountability
because they are not part of a market, they lack election
accountability because they are not a public governmental arena,
and they themselves are an accountability space because the NGO
sector grew up as an accountability arbiter for public and private
issues, in both the public policy arena and the market. 29
Addressing these concerns is important because the
development NGO sector has changed radically over the last 20
years. Today, it faces a new set of challenges. It is true that a broad
portion of the development literature insists that NGOs emerged in
the second half of the twentieth century as partners of social
movements mobilized in opposition of the state. 30 However, it is
also true that NGOs are different today. The informal and highly
personal network that made up the NGOs in the first stage has
become a transnational network with high standards of
professionalization, effectiveness, and management.31 We are now
in a new "NGO-isation" era and generally do not have the
framework to understand how and why an NGO is a daily actor in
social life. Most importantly, NGOs do not have criteria of selfgovernance and produce little record of how they assess their own
impact.3 2 Generating this kind of discussion, however, is important
to NGOs' effectiveness and credibility.
There is a split opinion regarding the role of NGOs in the
social arena. Coincidentally, the academic debate can be framed as
voices in favor of or against the performance of NGOs over the
past decade, and, as such, will shape the following section of the
28 Anderson, supranote 24.
29 Sue Cavill & M. Sohail, IncreasingStrategic Accountability: A Framework
for InternationalNGOs, 17 DEV. IN PRAC. 231 48 (2007).

Emma Mawdsley et al., RelationsNGOs HistoryProcess: Relation with State,
Beneficiaries,andDonors, 15 DEV. INPRAc. 78-82 (2005).
30

31d.
32

Cavill & Sohail, supra note 29.
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article. At the end of this section, the article will highlight the lack
of literature addressing the accountability process of NGOs.
However, going forward, it is important to recognize the favored
status NGOs have in the global political negotiation of social
issues.
A. The Favorable Face of NGOs
NGO policy activism has been widely portrayed in a heroic
light. Campaigns to abolish anti-personnel land mines, restrict
child labor, enforce marketing codes for infant formula, protect
dolphins and whales, and extend political and civil rights have
been covered favorably in the media, studied by a handful of
political scientists, and even honored with Nobel Peace laureates. 33
The image of NGOs as a social blessing usually
prominently appeared in scholarly articles from the 1980's and
remains much the same in current publications. According to this
view, NGOs are grassroots actors that translate the hopes of
marginalized populations into claims for a development sector. 34 In
this sense, the loss of faith in the state and official political process
as a vehicle for social change produced the birth of a "third
sector," consisting of actors operating outside the state structure
who are able to mobilize efforts and make agreements to deliver
welfare provisions. 35 In this narrative, it is the lack of
governmental action and market failure that creates an intermediate
sector, which fills in this regulatory vacuum and helps persons who
have been excluded from both the market and the political
36
processes.

3 Nelson, supranote 23, at 10.
See, e.g., Sasha Courville & Nicola Piper, HarnessingHope through NGO
Activism, 592 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 39-61 (2004).

Jasmine Gideon, The Politics of Social Service Provision through NGOs: A
Study of Latin America, 17 BULL. LATIN. AM. RES. 303, 305 (1998).
36

Jean Grugel, Romancing Civil Society: EuropeanNGOs in Latin America, 42

J. INTERAM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 87, 95 (2000).
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The most important thing to consider is the bottom-up
process underpinning NGOs. NGOs typically give voice to
marginalized people and attempt to construct alternatives that are
based on actual experiences and activities at the grassroots level.37
Insofar as they are "organic" actors, they actually represent the
voices of civil society.3 8
However, this kind of narrative also highlights other
attractive features of the NGOs' role. To begin, NGOs break the
traditional political dynamic of representation because their
formation is characterized by the presence of members of the
middle-urban class. 39 Next, NGOs represent a more attractive
organizational model than the state version because NGOs are
efficient, small scale, cost-effective, and easily managed.
Therefore, they have the potential to avoid corruption and
overconcentration of power. 40 Finally, NGOs increase the
empowerment of civil society because their performance favors
decentralization and facilitates political participation at the
grassroots level in the same way that it strengthens a radical
democratization process.41 Some case studies done in Latin
America are good examples of successful performances of this
type. 42

However, this image is not conclusive. As the next section
describes, there are also many voices that criticize the "good face"
of NGOs.

Courville & Piper,supranote 34, at 40.
supranote 21, at 783.
39 Paul J. DiMaggio & Helmut K Anheier, The Sociology of Nonprofit
Organizations and Sectors, 16 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 137, 141 (1990);
Mawdsley et al., supranote 30, at 78.
38 Molyneux,

40 ANTHONY BEBBINGTON ET AL., NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA: RETHINKING ROLES IN SUSTAINABLE
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT (1993); Telmo Rudi Frantz, The Role of NGOs
in the StrengtheningofCivil Society, 15 WORLD DEv. (SUPP.) 121, 126 (1987).
4'

Grugel, supranote 36, at 87-88.

42 See ANTHONY BEBBINGTON ET AL., NON-GOVERNMENTAL
AND THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA

(1993).

ORGANIZATIONS
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B. The Evil Face of NGOs
The growth of NGOs is a worldwide phenomenon. Some
see NGOs as the product of neo-liberal policies, financially
dependent on neo-liberal sources, and directly involved in
competing with socio-political movements for the allegiance of
local leaders and activist communities. Others see them as
mechanisms deployed for the "creation of civil society by external
intervention," noting the problematic conflation of NGOs with
"civil society" itself.43 A number of studies emphasize the negative
impact of NGOs on social movements and explore the impact of
what Sonia Alvarez has termed "NGOisation" on mobilization and
*44
social action.
This view is based on the same story of the state and the
market dichotomy, the split between the state and citizens or the
public and the private sphere, but with a different emphasis. For
scholars that subscribe to this perspective, "NGOisation" is a
buzzword in developing countries of the post-Washington
Consensus era.45 The result of the deregulation of the market and
accompanying liberalization and privatization processes has been
an increase of the "third sector"-non-state actors in charge of the
delivery of welfare goods. 46 However, this new birth is not fertile.
The popularity of NGOs hides their contradictory relations with
the state, their donors, and the people they claim to represent. 47
The neoliberal agenda that reduces the scope of public
duties creates a new professional elite in charge of seeking
international funds with a duty to replace the state in the provision

Islah Jad, NGOs: Between Buzzwords and Social Movements, 17 DEV. IN
PRAc.
622 (2007).
44
43

[d.

45 Molyneux, supranote 21, at 780.

Gideon, supra note 35, at 310-11.
Feldman, The Role of NGOs: Charity and
Empowerment: NGOs and Civil Society: (Un)stated Contradictions, 554
46

47 See generally Shelley

ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POLITICAL AND Soc. SC. 46 (1997).
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of social services.48 Hence, NGOisation follows the state's
withdrawal.4 9 In this scheme, citizen welfare is provided by
voluntary and private sector philanthropies rather than by the
state. 50 However, that NGOs are elites is apparent from the fact
that they have competing and contradictory interests in the struggle
for donor funds. 5'
The most important concern of this new elite is how they
link the resources secured in negotiations at the transnational,
regional, and local levels.52 The competition stage of NGOs'
claims and the claims related to their underlying bonds with
grassroots movements have been bargained with, broken, and
replaced by a new set of interests vested in the donor agenda and
elite management. All grassroots links are disrupted, and the
process of professionalization and specialization of resources
sought leads to the privatization of the welfare delivery.
NGOisation forces provision of social services into the
market and reproduces the inequality pattern of private delivery. It
is expected, for example, that in the strengthened period of
NGOisation, "the most marginal, economically disadvantaged
citizens [will] represent only a small proportion of the total number
of the NGOs' beneficiaries."53 This fact constitutes strong
evidence regarding the power relations between the NGOs and the
donors, the state, and the citizenry. After this reflection, some
questions remain. For instance, do NGOs represent civil society?
Which exclusions do the images projected by NGOs reinforce?
Who has access to the private resources distributed by NGO
programs? Who lacks access and why? What are the effects of this
selective coverage of assistive resources?

Molyneux, supra note 21, at 10.
49 Gideon, supra note 35 at 314-15.
48

50Jad, supra note

18, at 625 26.
5i Feldman, supra note 47.
52 Alan Fowler, DemonstratingNGO Performance:
Problems andPossibilities,
6 DEV. INPRAc. 58, 58-65 (Feb. 1996).
53 Feldman,supranote 47, at 61.
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Such complex power relations throughout the NGO
structure are analyzed in this article in three separate
configurations: (1) relations between NGOs and Northern donors;
(2) the relation of NGOs with the state and public structures; and
(3) the relations of NGOs with aid recipients, their beneficiaries, or
their social bases.
1. NGOs' Post-Colonial Domination in the
Development Field
There is a complex net of power relations among donors,
Northern NGOs, Southern NGOs, and community-based
organizations.54 The perspective of those who assert that there is
such a net of power states that NGOs are complicit in a new
colonization process with a strengthened North-South dynamic of
domination.5 5 The aid and project system is based on the idea that
there is a huge deficit of knowledge, money, and skills in the
global South, and that they need cooperation from the North in
order to function. 56 Thus, the logic goes, Northern resources are
transformed into benefits for the South. In certain contexts, this
view also involves the claim of westernization and post-colonial
domination.5 7
This particular form of external intervention is camouflaged
by what could be termed the specialized project development
mask.58 Thus, NGOisation is the process through which "issues of
collective concern are transformed into projects in isolation from
the general context in which they are applied, excluding due
considerations of the economic, social, and political factors
affecting [these] projects."59 NGOs are now purveyors of
development projects addressed to international aid and

54 Fowler, supranote 52, at 59.

5 Jad,supra note 18, at 625-26.
56 Fowler, supra note 52, at 58.
Feldman, supranote 47, at 48, 50-51.
58Jad, supra note 18, at 624 25.
59

Id. at 623.
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The implementation of development projects is the core of
both NGO performance and Northern/Neo-Liberal domination.61
As evidence of this surprise link, I present the idea that the crash of
social provisions in the last twenty years is strongly related to
NGOs' role; they perform their new duties of welfare delivery by
reproducing the inequalities of the market. 62 As a result of these
circumstances, NGOs make regressive distribution of resources,
creating an inadequate and unequal provision of social services in
Latin America, poorly targeted at the population involved and
affected by vested interests. 6 3
Therefore, according to those who hold this view
definitively, the NGO intervention is not a process of
democratization, informalization, or individualization that
produces a devolution of control from the ineffective bureaucracy
of the state to a committed grassroots cause. Rather, NGOisation is
the expansion of a new form of external assistance that demands
the privatization of resource allocation. This is problematic, the
narrative goes, because NGOs have a "fake face" that legitimizes
their performance, hiding similarities between the private sector
and the new philanthropic enterprise. 64 This also produces a depoliticization of the public challenge to poverty, inequality, and
social injustice while fostering the new NGOs' participation format
and taking advantage of the ethical connotations of the civil society

Uma Narayan, Informal Sector Work, Microcredit and Women's
Empowerment: A Critical Overview (unpublished draft, available at
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a v&pid sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWF
pbnx1d3Nhd31lcnNlbWluYXJ8Z3g6Mzc5YTJlYmQwNzkyOGlyNA&pli=1).
60

61 Id.
62 See

Feldman, supra note 47, at 61; Gideon, supranote 35, at 312; Jad, supra
note 18, at 622.
63Gideon, supra note 35, at 312.
64
[d
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label.65 In this sense, NGOs do not help to create political
citizenship, but rather act to create a political clientele. 66
2. Performance Failure: QuasiGovernmental Structure and Lack of
Accountability
The state and the donors, rather than the social actors, have
determined the script for NGOs. Scholars that make claims
condemning the role of NGOs also note that these organizations
have been harnessed by the state and used as instruments to deploy
a neo-liberal agenda.67 By using the NGOs' scheme, the state is
able to secure more money from international funding pools and
bilateral donors, and it achieves more by reducing the portion of its
own budget allocated to social programs. As a matter of a fact, the
instrumentalization of NGOs allows the state to reduce agencies'
functions and artificially avoids pressure to reform bureaucratic
and ineffective governmental institutions. 68
Moreover, scholars that advocate for this position also
argue that NGOs take on quasi-governmental characteristics. It is
untrue, they claim, that NGOs' structures represent a less corrupt
governmental option. NGOs exhibit cases of rent seeking and
misuse of public funds. In this sense, NGOs replace the state, but
not in a positive way, because they are presumably less able to
respond immediately to demands articulated by the citizenry, a
circumstance, which joined with the lack of accountability, affects
the empowerment capability of the citizens. Furthermore, over
time, NGOs become isolated from civil society and ultimately lose
their grassroots contact. After a while, they really do not represent
an alternative to governmental structures. 69

65
66

Feldman, supra note 47, at 61.
Gideon, supra note 35, at 312.

67 id.
68
69

id.
d
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3. Lack of Social Base
As previously stated, NGOs and international actors
negotiate their mutual relationships, and in this space, there is no
place for the grassroots interest. 70 NGOs have the power to
manipulate, renegotiate, and legitimize donor agendas at the local
level and use these resources to foster their own agenda and elite
interests. In this process, the discourse of the NGOs comes to
exclude marginalized interpretations of social issues, while they
become the exclusive interlocutors in the international arena.
For the NGOs and their donors, the collective well-being is
not at stake. NGOs are not from "the people." Rather, NGOs are
vehicles for some international elites. 72 As a matter of fact, NGO
actors lose all of their representative character. Given the absence
of any democratic dynamic by which those who are purportedly
represented might call these actors to account, and the fact that
NGOs are not actually pursuing the interests of those they
purportedly represent, NGOs are unequivocally not the voice of the
civil society actors.7 3
The dynamic articulated in this view implies that NGOs fail
in the protection of minority groups. 74 The consequence of this
failure is the fostering of inequality by allocating resources that
rightfully belong to the most poverty-stricken parts of the
population in an asymmetrical fashion. This happens because
NGOs neither have a connection with the grassroots nor with the
social knowledge to target their beneficiaries.
Hence, large
NGOs' performances exhibit a broad exclusionary effect: they
Jad, supra note 18, at 625-26.
Id.
72 Anderson, supra note
24.
73 Rehfeld, supranote 22, at 1 21.
74 See generally, Narayan, supra note 60, drawing attention to the way in which
our understanding of the state and its formal powers makes us blind to different
and informal structures that affect political identities, particularly in a global
context. For instance, the author raises the question of accountability of nonstate entities whose work reinforces cultural essentialism (such as the work of
development agencies, NGOs, and even academic feminists).
75 See Jad, supranote 18, at 622-29.
70

71
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systematically hide the presence of small NGOs with radical
agendas, 76 bypassing the social base, undermining grassroots
organizations in the "official channels" of civil society
interlocution, 77 and weakening accountability to the beneficiaries.
As this sets in, NGOs cannot represent their beneficiaries any
longer; they are part of a "globalized elite" rather than a "global
,,78
civil- society.
C. The Lack of Accountability as a Convergent
Diagnosis
Unlike commercial companies, development NGOs do not
have a "bottom line" of market feedback, profitability, and return
on financial investment of commercial companies. NGOs also do
not receive the judgment of citizens through social unrest or the
periodic vote. In other words, consumers and voters are the source
of performance standards for business and government, but not for
"non-profits." Thus, we must first determine the source of criteria
against which non-profit organizational performance should be
assessed.79 Second, we must set standards and carry out the
assessment.8 0
What benefits do NGOs gain by demonstrating that they are
accountable and legitimate? How can we improve the performance
of NGOs in terms of the tension between their beneficiaries, state
bureaucracies, and donors mentioned above? While NGOs are
recognized for their important roles in developing and
implementing democratization, less attention is given to how they
affect the economic and social reorganization of everyday life.
How can their impacts be measured, and how can their

Gideon, supra note 35, at 310-11.
77 Mawdsley et al., supranote 30, at 78.
78 DiMaggio & Anheier, supra note 39,
at 141.
79
Fowler, supra note 52, at 58.
80
76

id.
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performances be assessed?81 In response to this lack of assessment,
scholars studying NGO accountability, philanthropies, and
development practitioners have all shown a great deal of interest
over the last ten years. Today, a lack of accountability is one of the
main issues for NGOs in the development field.
In contrast to the role and perception debate, the
accountability issue represents a convergence of different voices,
resulting in discussions only over the intensity of the account
required. 82 For example, sometimes outcomes are difficult to
measure because the human development result is a complex mix
of non-linear processes. 83 This represents a substantial challenge
for development accountability. As a result, they have only soft
accountability.84
Some have argued that if NGOs are to achieve their
missions, more strategic forms of hard accountability will be
required.8 5 For scholars on this side, NGOs need to adjust their
new prominence to respond to a more serious dynamic of
assessment challenges on three axes: (1) representation and
legitimation; (2) achievement of mission statement, redistribution
and empowerment of target population; and (3) fostering of the
democratization process.86 NGOs have to address functional and
strategic accountability issues in responding to the accusations of
elitism and instrumentalization because, as stated above, this issue
negatively impacts their credibility and effectiveness.
However, the new path of social and horizontal NGO
accountability is an unconstructed enterprise to which this article
attempts to contribute. As the literature section shows, and the
s1 See Courville & Piper, supra note 34, at 40; Feldman, supra note 47, at 46;
Gideon, supranote 35, at 310-11.
82 See Cavill & Sohail, supra note 29; Feldman,
supranote 47, at 46; Fowler,
supra note 52, at 58; Rehfeld, supranote 22, at 9-10; LISA JORDAN & PETER
VAN TUIJL, NGO ACCOUNTABILITY: POLITICS, PRINCIPLES AND INNOVATIONS 10
(2006).
See Fowler, supranote 52, at 58.
84

8
86

d.
Cavill & Sohail, supranote 29.
Fowler, supra note 52, at 59.
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broad literature of the development sector emphasizes, there is
currently not enough regulation to address issues of representation
and accountability of NGOs, in general; however, there is also not
enough review specifically within the field of Migration NGOs. In
relevant literature, NGOs' accountability analysis has shown the
NGOs as actors of horizontal accountability for the government. It
has also said a little about the NGOs' assessment.8 7 In the field of
migration, there are few authors discussing the representativeness
on the part of Migration NGOs in the transnational context." As a
result, there is a lack of studies on the accountability of NGOs that
engage with the migration mobilization in Colombia. This article
aims to fill this gap.
III.

METHODOLOGY AND MAPPING THE
PROTAGONISTS: CASE STUDY

The methodology used was based on a case study of two
interconnected
organizations:
Fundacidn Esperanza and
PlataformaSocial HERMES.89 The case study analyzed the joint
mobilization of these organizations in support of the creation of a
National System for Migration between February and May 2010,
while the Draft legislation was studied in the Colombian Congress.
The case study included, as methodological tools, analysis
of the regulatory framework related to the National System of
Migration and other related legal documents pertaining to
Migration Policy, as well as qualitative techniques of empirical
research. With respect to this last dimension, the case study is
based on three specific activities: (1) unstructured interviews with
Carolina Moreno Velzquez, El DesplazamientoForzado en Colombia y las
Mujeres Victimas: Una Reflexi6n Acerca del Auto 092 y Sus Posibles
Aplicaciones, PERSPECTIVAS CONTEMPORANEAS DE LA INVESTIGACION
JURIDICA, 179-200 (2012).
8 Olga L. Gonzlez, Derechos Humanos, Migrantes y Transnacionalismo,69
REVISTA COLOMBIA INTERNACIONAL, 124-41 (2009).
89 PLATAFORMA SOCIAL MIGRATORIA HERMES, http://psmhermes.wordpress.
com (last visited Jan. 28, 2013).
1
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actors; (2) one focus group with the relevant NGOs; and (3) two
informal observations of actor meetings in the context of the
advocacy process for the National System of Migration.
In order to explain how the case study was constructed, this
article will reference (a) the actors involved in the field and (b) the
description of the Migration Policy, with the objective of showing
what is at stake in the NGOs' advocacy in favor of the National
System of Migration.
A. The Main Actors
Fundaci6n Esperanza (hereinafter "Fundaci6n") is an NGO
founded 17 years ago that is solidly positioned within the world of
migration. Not only is the Fundaci6n the leading organization in
the academic and informal network for migration in Colombia, but,
according to a November 2009 report produced by the program
Colombia Nos Une [United by Colombia], it also receives 33% of
the total international cooperation resources spent on work in the
areas of legal and illegal immigration that enter to Colombia. 90
At first look, this author was surprised to find that the
Fundaci6n was engaged in a process of policy advocacy. It was a
shift from my original research objective of tracing the ratification
of the 2003 UN Migrants Protocol. This lobbying turned out to be
central to the work of the Fundaci6n during the months of my
research and involved promoting the Sistema Nacional Migratorio
(National System for Migration), which had been previously
recommended in the official planning document known as
CONPES 3603 of 2009 and was presented as draft legislation to
the House of Representatives and the Senate. 9 1

See Consejo Nacional de Politica Econ6mica y Social [CONPES] 3603,
(Colom.) (discussing the
Colombia Nos Une program).
9' See id; L. 016/09, May 31, 2011, Gaceta Del Congreso (Colom.); L. 070/09,
90

POLiTICA INTEGRAL MIGRATORIA, Aug. 24, 2009

PLATAFORMA SOCIAL MIGARTORIA HERMES (Colom.).
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The advocacy process, led by the Fundaci6n was,
furthermore, mediated by the existence of an informal network of
civil society organizations with knowledge of the topic, the
Plataforma HERMES (hereinafter "Plataforma"). The Plataforma
is an entirely informal network with no legal status. Nevertheless it
is highly institutionalized, with hierarchical structures, functional
divisions, and strategic organization, and it was created with the
objective of promoting an advocacy agenda capable of achieving
the creation ofthe National System for Migration. 92
The Plataforma grew out of an academic research network,
known as the Red Nacional de Migraciones [National Migration
Network], founded in 2002 by the universities of the coffeeproducing region called the Alma Mater; it was also joined by
NGOs active in this area. The Plataforma has 28 member
organizations drawn from civil society, of which seven were
chosen as subjects of this research. These organizations include:
the Fundaci6n Esperanza (which coordinated the network until
February 2010), Alma Mater, CODHES, Humanas, Manos
Amigas, Sisma Mujer and the current coordinator of the
Plataforma, the Confederaci6n General del Trabajo (General Labor
Confederation, and CGT, representative of the trade union
confederations). In November 2008, these organizations initiated a
process intended to ensure that the "national government took
See generally Hermes, PLATAFORMA SOCIAL MIGRATORIA DECLARACION
(2008) (Colom.) (discussing the need for a National System of Migration in
Colombia, I believe it is important to mention at this stage that the advocacy
strategy developed by the Plataforma was entirely orthodox in that it focused on
lobbying (the strategic exchange of specific resources with members of
Congress) as the principal instrument intended to promote their proposals. There
was no media or communications strategy (for example, there is no press
archive on draft laws 070 and 016 other than what appears in the specialist
portals such as Congreso Visible, the Senate news bulletin and the pages
covering the political agenda of the presidential party, La U, since it was Dario
Angarita of this party who presented the draft law in the first debate). The
strategy did not involve any social mobilization activities and shows no interest
in developing campaigns in the symbolic or legal spheres).
92
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responsibility for the migrant population." 93 These organizations
are, additionally, the authors of the government proposals currently
being debated in Congress.
Methodologically, the research process involved nonstructured interviews with members of each of the selected
organizations. In some cases, such as Fundaci6n Esperanza and
Alma Mater, I met with several members of staff, created a focus
group involving NGO participants in the network, and interviewed
those responsible for communications between the Plataforma and
the national government (Colombia Nos Une), the Bogota district
government (the Secretary for External Relations), and members of
Congress (Senator Dario Angarita, Piedad Zucardi, Alexandra
Piraquive and Germin Navas Talero).
A total of 17 individuals involved in the field of migration
were interviewed: four members of NGOs, one member of the
trade union federations, four members of the government,
including advisors to the Foreign Ministry (Colombia Nos Une),
high ranking officials in the Bogota administration (from the
General Secretariat), four legislative advisors to the sponsors of the
bill (from the Partido de la U, Movimiento MIRA and Polo
Democrdtico Alternativo), and four academic advisors (from Alma
Mater and the Universidad Javeriana). One focus group was
organized, and it included eight members of different NGOs that
were linked to the Plataforma. Finally, two participant observation
sessions were organized (at a meeting to discuss Bogotd's district
migration policy and putting a workshop into good practice for
government migration policy at the Colombian Commission of
Jurists).
The figure below illustrates the map of protagonists
covered by the research, which was carried out between February
and May 2010:

93

See id.
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Figure 1 - Map of protagonists and research scenario

As the figure shows, the analysis maps social and state
actors at the domestic level. The case study provides less analysis
of funding networks mobilized at the international level and only
has access to the funding documents of two NGOs that discuss
their compromises and agreements with international cooperation
agencies. However, these documents are important because they
provide evidence about how the political framework for designing
institutional and legal institutions in the migration field was
transposed from the Global North to the Global South. To this
extent, the case study also addressed the transformation of political
and legal agendas articulated by different actors in both
international and domestic settings. As a result, the discussion
delves into the actual content of the exchange among international
and domestic actors as a means to understand how the promotion
of "return" by NGOs sponsors became a rally cry for the National
System of Migration in a domestic context. The discussion also
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examines how international and domestic frames work to
discourage international labor migration to the North.
B. The Migration Policy: What Is at Stake at the
Domestic Level?
The proposal presented by the Plataforma involved the
following three basic steps. First, the establishment of a
bureaucratic structure, in the form of a National Migration

Council and Fund, as a consultative body of the national
government for questions of migration. 94 It was proposed that the
Fund would have a dedicated budget and would be registered as a
legal entity under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry. 95 The
ministry would also establish regulations covering the fund and
would be able to contract staff according to the provisions of
private law. 96
Second, reform of the system of budgetary provisions was

proposed,wherein 20% of the Foreign Ministry's rotating fund and
50% of the departure taxes paid by Colombian nationals would be
made available to fund the Council's budget. 97 The core Budget
would derive from budgetary provisions currently assigned the
same category in the Foreign Ministry's budget. 98
94

See L. 070/09, PLATAFORMA SOCIAL MIGARTORIA HERMES (Colom.).
95 See id.

See id. One of the peculiarities of the proposal to create a bureaucratic
structure is the minute work of defining the responsibilities within the
administrative structure of the Council. The members of the Plataforma worked
very closely with a specialist in administrative law to create a diagram
illustrating the future council's various administrative and disciplinary
responsibilities and profiling its future officials as individuals who would be
"truly committed to working in favor of the migrant [population]."
9 Id.
98 There are important differences between the two versions of the draft law on
this point. While draft law 070 of 2010, which was presented by the Plataforma,
referred in article 14 to these resources, draft 016, the Senate version, presented
by Senator Angarita made no such reference. Various members of the
Plataforma stated in the interviews that the presentation of a parallel draft by the
supporters of the President was an initiative coordinated in bad faith by
Colombia Nos Une, a program that had never agreed with the budgetary
96
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Third, an operationalstrategy was proposed,whereby the
investment budget would be assigned to the following areas: the
development of national and regional governmental migration
policies with a human rights focus; the coordination of the
activities related to migration to be carried out by the central
government and decentralized bodies; the application of the
principle of budgetary subsidization in favor of the most-affected
regional authorities; the mapping, surveying, and analyzing of the
migrant population for whom the Colombian state is responsible;
and the development of return plans to facilitate the reintegration
of migrants in their original social and domestic networks. 99
To this extent, the "return" agenda promoted by the
international cooperation of the Global North as a means of
decreasing the international labor migration to their countries was
translated into from the international stage (i.e. EEUU or Spain as
recipient states) to a domestic stage (Colombia as the migrant
provider).100 The initial interest in decreasing labor migration was
transformed at the domestic level into the demand for a national
bureaucracy to deal with the migrant population, a bureaucracy
that requires the competencies of the Migration NGOs' elite. The
analysis of the results section describes how the agenda of "return"
was transformed into the National System of Migration. These
proposals included in the original draft, and which led to the Finance Ministry
withdrawing its support. This position, which was opposed to that of the Foreign
Ministry, was recorded in legal opinions submitted by the director of the
International Affairs Office on 6 October 2009 and the head of the Internal
Legal Advice Section on 27 January 2010, respectively. See Memorandum from
Juan Jose Paez to Natalia Maria Iregui Ortigoza, MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES
EXTERIORES (Jan. 27, 2010); Memorandum from Karen Mendoza Manjarres to
Alvaro Sandoval Bernal, MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES (Oct. 6,

2009).
99 See L. 070/09, supra note 77. These guidelines are included in Section 1 of
the draft law dealing with principles, object and general regulations, especially
in: article 1- Object, article 2- Aim and article 4- Principles.
100 Iker Barbero, Ciudadania y Migraciones. Hacia nuevos Pluralismos Juridicos,
http://www.hegoa.ehu.es/congreso/bilbo/komu/3_Participacion/2 IkerBarbero.pdf.
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steps are described as relationships of instrumentalization,
complementation and capture, and impersonation between NGOs
and different actors in the field.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS

As stated at the beginning of this article, I will explain the
role of Migration NGOs in Colombia within three different kinds
of relationships: (1) instrumentalization, (2) complementarity and
capture, and (3) impersonation. While instrumentalization is the
dominant interaction in the relationship between NGOs and the
international community, aspects of complementarity and capture
characterize the relationship between NGOs and local government.
On a different level, the impersonation dynamic best describes the
relationship between NGOs and the migrant population.
Therefore, this case study offers a complex setting in which
NGOs interact with three different actors at two different levels.
Migration NGOs take action at both the domestic level and the
international level. It is clear that the Migration NGOs main
activities take place in the domestic context, where the National
System of Migrations pretends to work. At this level, Migration
NGOs have interactions with local bureaucrats in the executive and
legislative branches, where they mainly perform two roles: to
complement the public action or to capturethe public rent.
However, the Migration NGOs also have an important
presence at the international level. In a vertical relation,
Migrations NGOs have a close relationship with the funding
agencies that set their action agenda. The NGOs' domestic actions
follow an agenda that serves international interests and attempts to
resolve international migration from the perspective of the migrant
receptor countries. NGOs are instrumentalizedwhen international
cooperation imposes funding strategy agendas.
Furthermore, the Migration NGOs in Colombia not only
engage in an international interaction with the migrants, who live
in an international context and toward whom they have few
mechanisms of accountability due to the geographical distance, but
they also address the political and economic problems that have
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made representation of the migrants difficult. At this level,
Migration NGOs show an impersonation relationship with the
migrant population.
Figure 2 shows how the actors interact at both the
international and domestic levels.
Domestic Leve
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Figure 2 - Actors and international and domestic dynamics

The next section will describe each of the relationships by
offering evidence extracted from the case study and interpreted
according to the tools presented in the literature review section.
The relations will be addressed in the follow order: (a)
Instrumentalization, (b) Complementary and Capture, and (c)
Impersonation.
A. NGOs and International Cooperation: The
Instrumentalization Relationship
The discourse of the Plataforma, in connection with the
"return" to the state, is mediated-and theoretically addressed
by-the prescribed role of the state in the globalization era
developed by authors such as Gayatri Spivak and Judith Butler in
Who Sings to National-State?0 1 According to the Plataforma, the
101 JUDITH BUTLER & GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, WHO SINGS THE
NATION-STATE?: LANGUAGE, POLITICS, BELONGING (2007).
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discourse concerning the internationalization of human rights has
failed to fulfill its promise of homogenization, and instead has
created vulnerable subjects beyond national frontiers, whose plight
reminds us that the state is currently the only effective distributor
of rights. According to the Plataforma, the Colombian state has an
unredeemed debt for its involvement. This is because the
Plataforma has financed its development model with the proceeds
from remittances, which, since 2003, have made the second highest
contribution to the national economy.102
Nationally, the Plataformapresents the question of migrant
rights according to the typical liberal views that argue for a tradeoff between security and protection, such that the state has:
undermined guarantees to work and dignity, causing people
to migrate. Migrants are owed an unredeemed debt by the
state, which has failed to protect them. For their part, the
migrant population has never ceased to exercise its duties
as citizens-migrants continue to participate in their family
and social networks, construct group identity, run
businesses and establish networks with other Colombians,
even though they are living abroad; but above all, they
make regular contributions to fixed national income
through the well-known mechanism of remittances; they
also own property in their native land (because, naturally,
the principal long-term destination of remittances is
property). 103
At the international level, the justification of the return to
the state is more complex. A cursory examination might suggest
that migrations are mechanisms of emancipation from the nation
state, or movements that tend to destabilize the closed systems that
define citizenship. However, the people who push these types of
reforms-those that, like the National System for Migration, focus
Interview with Roberto Vidal, Member of Plataforma Social Hermes and
Assoc. Professor, Universidad Javeriana (Apr. 23, 2010).
10
JInterview with William Mejia, Dir. Of Alma Mater Network (Apr. 13, 2010).
102
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on the role of the nation state in dealing with international
movements of peoples, turn skeptical when faced with a critical
movement that privileges the ecumene or the "global village"
above national citizenship.1 04 Instead, this new approach would
follow Mouffe in arguing that the idea of a "global village" is
absurd because the idea of citizenship, of an exclusive and
excluding us, would require the development of equality and
democratic government.105 Post nationality (or a regime of
citizenship that goes beyond the national-state in a global sense)
does not allude at all to a world demo, 106 with the consequence that
there is no alternative but that of returning to the state. In
particular, and in the words of one of the Plataforma's leaders, it is
necessary to return to the state for the reasons given by Schmitt in
his recent critical readings. The readings conclude, sadly, that the
discourses of international human rights have depoliticized rights,
uprooted them from their origins in the shared citizenship of a
political community, and that these rights have consequently
evaporated, decentralized, been thrown to the wind and made
"intangible," while the power to distribute them has been handed
over to the market.107 As Roberto Vidal, a member of the
Plataforma explains:
We have to start fighting for control of the Foreign Ministry
because we cannot renounce the role of the state as the
material source of a discourse that favors rights. We need the
state. The Colombian state is also the migrant's state because
the Colombian citizenship is the only system of right that we
have. That's why the National System of Migration is based
on the state's come back in the field of migration 10 8
104 CHANTAL MOUFFE, LA PARADOJA DEMOCRATICA,

BARCELONA

[THE

DEMOCRATIC PARADOX] 55 (2003).
105 Id.
106

Or a global democratic political system with a global citizenship base.

107 CHANTAL MOUFFE, supra note 104.
10 Interview with Roberto Vidal, member

of Plataforma Social Hermes and
Assoc. Professor at Universidad Javeriana (Apr. 23, 2010).
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In a sense, national-level organizations for migrant rights
are reminders of the intense territorial compartmentalization of
rights in general.1 09 For rights to be enjoyed, it is necessary to seek
out and defend the citizenry because there is no more efficient way
than for the state and the territory to approach the question of
rights. According to the discourse of the Migration NGOs, rights as
we know them are tremendously territorial and rooted in the
state.

10

However, the arguments forwarded by the Plataforma,
described in the previous paragraph, markedly contrast the
dissident line of Colombia Nos Une and other associations of
Colombians based in the exterior who work with the Foreign
Ministry."' In a letter sent to Senator Dario Angarita on November
22, 2009, these groups expressed their disagreement. The letter
treats the initiatives advanced by the Plataforma with suspicion and
criticizes the instrumentalist role it plays.'2 The signatories of the
letter argued that initiatives to strengthen nation states and increase
their levels of responsibility in the area of migration policy
constitute a cruel game headed by the Spanish International
Cooperation Agency (AECI)."' They further noted that Spain is
the receptor of migrants from Latin America par excellence and a
principal source of funding for the NGO members of the
Plataforma.11 4 This illustrates the game played by international
09

ADRIANA MEDINA, RE-PENSAR LOS DERECHOS DE LOS MIGRANTES DESDE
ABAJO (2011).
110 HANNAH ARENDT, Los ORIGENES DEL TOTALITARISMO (1998); GIORGIO

AGAMBEN,

HOMO SACER, Pre-Textos: Valencia (1998); Roberto Vidal,
Multiculturalismode iday vuelta. Herramientasparala Agencia Politicade los
MigrantesInternacionales(Mar. 9, 2012).
...Interview Ximena Botero, Dir., Colombia nos Une [Unitedby Colombia], in
COLOM. (Mar. 23, 2010).
112 Letter from Colombianos en el Exterior Organization, to Dario Angarita,
Senator (Nov. 22, 2009).
113 id.
114 The reactions of the migrant groups that work with the state and represent the
"legal" pole of migration demonstrate the ambivalence of the ideological
positions that characterize the field of migration. The postcolonial domination
argument, which critiques the new mechanisms of subordination in the
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cooperation agencies from the receptor context. These agencies
seek to use their support for non-governmental programs to
promulgate strategies aimed at strengthening the policies and
programs for migrants in the migrant-producing countries, while
refusing to take responsibility for those migrants living in their
own territories. Addressing this, the letter read:
The National System of Migration is going to serve the
receptor countries by decreasing the responsibility of these
states for migrant rights. Constructing restricted national
origin systems of protection for international migrants is a
violation of human rights that must be guaranteed to
international migrants in any place of the world."'
The Plataforma is perceived by the "legal pole," which
defends the status quo as no more than a tool of international
cooperation agencies; it not only transplants the interests of the
center to the periphery and launders their image by using the
facade of solidarity, but it also has the entirely perverse effect of
damaging those it seeks to protect.11 6 Additionally, the Plataforma
developing world and brings into focus the reproduction of colonial relations in
the 21st Century, is instrumentalized within the debate on migration by the more
conservative tendencies-those that represent the status quo as materialized in
the Uribe government's policies on migration (Colombia Nos Une). Their
argument is clearly opposed to those forwarded by the "progressive wing"
represented by the civil society groups in favor of the "extension of migrant
rights" and their consequent effect on the "consolidation, strengthening and
efficiency of the structure of the national state."
"' Author's free translation of letter sent to Senator Dario Angarita on
November 22, 2009. Letter from Colombianos en el Exterior Organization, to
Dario Angarita, Senator (Nov. 22, 2009).
116 On its home page, the Fundaci6n Esperanza identifies the following funders:
the European Union, the Netherlands Embassy, OXFAM Netherlands, the IOM,
Manos Unidas, Unifem, the ILO, the Swiss Embassy, the US Embassy, the
Spanish Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the Instituto de la Mujer, Terre
des Hommes, the Fondo para la acci6n ambiental y la nifiez (Spain), Partners of
the Americas (Japan), Asistencia Social Para el Desarrollo, of the Government
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legitimizes the interests of the North, and prejudices those actors in
the periphery who have opted to take underdevelopment to the
Center in a process that reverses the colonial endeavor.1 17 The
hidden agenda of international cooperation, then, involves a
repatriationof the protection of the migrant population's rights." 8
This does not reflect a philosophical or political confidence in the
nation state as a system for the distribution of rights, but rather the
material impossibility (or a Northern unwillingness) of protecting
the rights and guarantees of the affected human population. 119
This last point introduces the first approach to the
relationships between the actors examined in this article, that is,
the instrumental relationship. With respect to the international
cooperation bodies, the Plataforma is an instrument that channels
of Madrid, and, from Colombia: the mayoral office, Melgar, Governor's Office,
Valle del Cauca and the Mayor's Office, Bogot6 (General Secretariat). The
arguments concerning the international cooperation agencies are valid when
applied to receptor governments as for development NGOs. Only the financial
support provided by Colombian regional governmental entities escapes the
postcolonial framework.
117 ARTURO ESCOBAR,

ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING AND

(Princeton Univ. Press 1995).
Member of Plataforma Social Hermes and
Assoc. Professor, Universidad Javeriana (Apr. 23, 2010).
119 Mar Moroll6n, Cooperaci6nInternacional:Encuentros y Desencuentros, in
EN PIE DE PAZ (Dec. 1999) (discussing two interesting effects of this
relationship that emerge if the perspective of post-colonial domination is
applied. First, cooperation for development, or described differently, the
disinterested investment by the First World in the Third of "donations,"
establishes implicit contracts defining property and submission, under whose
terms the recipients are enslaved by their duty to implement, and to be
accountable to, externally imposed parameters that define "the meaning of
development." But, in addition, international cooperation purges any sense of
guilt from the Center, reducing its sense of anxiety at the sacrifice made by the
subaltern. This last approach sits well with the argument of Spivak in her
critique of post-colonial reason where she indicates that these scenarios
reproduce an inappropriate image of the subaltern (native, aboriginal, oriental)
that responds to the particular self-image of the colonizer and makes it
(im)possible for the subaltern to be represented within the codes of production
proper to the western being).
UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD
1is Interview with Roberto Vidal,
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the process of domination by purchasing interests using solidarity
mechanisms and international donations. Since the Plataforma is a
closed and cohesive network, it is able to sell itself as a structure
independent of the interests of the receptor countries, whose real
aim is to repatriate the rights of the migrants living in their
territories.120 Within this scheme, arguments concerning the return
of migrants to the originating state do not merely reflect the liberal
facade intended to disguise the game of post-colonial oppression
that involves the exchange of resources intended for cooperation in
development.121 The migrants actually end up being part of a
conspiracy, in as much as they facilitate the return to the nationallevel structures that empower the center and return the
responsibility for subalterns to the precarious scenarios in the
periphery where they seek to exercise their rights as citizens.
Therefore, international cooperation agencies are the power
elites behind the throne of the Plataforma.122 According to the
Mills' formulation, and as Gideon, Mawdsley, and Fowler have
recognized, the power elite functions by creating subaltern
mechanisms that appear to have the power of agency, but, in fact,
involuntarily execute decisions that are not made by them and
which favor the circles of power behind them. 123 In this concrete
case, the internal mobilization concerning the rights of migrants at
the domestic level serves the interests of the receptor countries
because it lays responsibility for the destiny of migrants at the door
of their countries of origin, while, at the same time, reduces the
level of interest required of the receptor countries.

120
121
122

Hermes,
id.

PLATAFORMA SOCIAL MIGRATORIA DECLARACION

(2008) (Colom.)

C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (Oxford Univ. Press 1993).

123See

generally Gideon, supranote 35, at 305; Mawdsley et al., supranote
30,
at 78; Fowler, supra note 52, at 58-59.
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B. NGOs and Local Government:
Complementary and Capture Dynamics
Several conclusions can be drawn from this case study. One
of them is related to the way that informal networks, like the
Plataforma, are constructed, in terms of their success as informal
and strategic mechanisms coordinating different "independent"
actors, namely NGOs, trade unions, and the academy.12 4 These
organizations came together to create a "network of alliances" 125 in
an attempt to connect experts, victims, and all the other social
sectors affected by the phenomenon of migration in a single
scenario defined by mutual confidence and shared values to work
together for common objectives.
An interesting fictional script created a filial union between
them; a dialogue with the state marked all the interviews and
discussions with interviewees. In these conversations, I inquired
about the reasons for their existence, their objectives, and the tasks
carried out by members of the NGOs and other members of the
Plataforma. It was strange to find that they justified their role as
being a consequence of the absence of the state, the inefficiency of
public services, and the lack of governance. 126 It is interesting to
124

See generally,Narayan, supra note 60.

125CHARLES TILLY, IDENTITIES,

BOUNDARIES,

(2005)
(describing the Plataforma HERMES as a "network of alliances" according to
the parameters established by Network Theory. It relates that the Plataforma is a
closed social structure of individuals and organizations connected by one or
more kinds of informal relationship (friendship, shared interests, intermittent
economic exchange) and who share beliefs, knowledge, convictions or prestige.
The analytical advantage of network theory is that it illustrates the collective
actions undertaken to achieve specific ends and that it analyzes these social
outputs by examining the social realities of the microcosm of the network).
126 It is interesting to emphasize the ways in which the incautious everyday
attitudes of the members of the Plataforma enter into dialogue with the different
approaches of the specialized literature on the role of NGOs and civil society
organizations as a whole. There is specialist literature linking the emergence of
NGOs with the social crises associated with the decline of the model of the
welfare state-or the failure to develop the model in the third world. For this
literature, the organization of civil society is also a symptom of the feeling that
the public sphere has been abandoned. Nelson Ard6n, Andres Felipe Cubillos y
AND SOCIAL TIES
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see how, on a day to day level, civil society actors echoed these
fictions; not only does their fierce opposition lead them to argue
for the existence of a state that does not in fact exist, but they also
exhibit the intimate need to demonstrate how it has "abandoned"
its role.127 It is precisely this sensation of solitude that constructs
their complicity and cements their joint labors:
[W]e should be working together .

.

. it's the fact that the

state is absent that obliges us to organize and resist the fact
it has abandoned the population, to remind the state that it
has made promises to the population that it has failed to
honor . . . we in the NGOs even serve as a replacement of

the state. If the state were not failing in its duty we would
not exist.128
Similarly, this sensation of abandonment ends up
constructing its own machinery; the Plataforma is a surprising
example of the systematic articulation of different civil society
actors linked by informal ties, which has achieved ample results in
relation to a single objective.
Not only does the Plataforma have its own independent
network of researchers on migration that it uses to provide its
information base,129 but it has also constructed a complex
Ang61ica Pefia. Andlisis de la Politica Pfiblica Migratoriaen Amdrica Latina,
Universidad de Deusto (Mar. 9, 2012, 9:32 AM), http://www. oppal.deusto.
es/servlet/Satellite/Generico/1241628030494/ cast/%231206981952041%23120
8174081455/0/cO/UniversidadDeusto/comun/render?tipoColeccion=Page.
127 Lina Buchely, La Patologia del Estado. Aproximacidn Critica a la
Utilizaci6n de la Fdrmulade la Ausencia del Estado en la Academia Legal, in
REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO (Dec. 2010)
128 Posting of Oscar, oscargomez@fundacionesperanza.org, and Zully Laverde,
Zully.laverde@codhes.org, to colombiamigra@freelist.org (May 5, 2010) (on
file with author).
129 Posting of Johana Sdenz, johana.saenz@cancilleria.gov.co,
and Silvana
Moncada, smoncada@alcadiadebogota.gov.co, to colombiamigra@freelist.org
(Apr.-May 2010) (on file with author). The network of researchers is managed
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cooperation and support network that operates as a block, despite
its disparate composition. For example, the Plataforma does not
have any legal status. There is no clear budget, and no
headquarters or rules of procedure. In contrast, the Plataforma
responds energetically and with rigor to calls for proposals (which
occurred roughly every two weeks during the period of research);
it completes all its assigned tasks within the deadlines set; it has a
house style for the presentation of its results (which is replicated
by all its members); and it represents en bloc, the interests of the
totality of its members. Any public statement made by the
Plataforma, or by any one of its members, precisely articulates the
interests of all the sectors involved: the internal interests of the
trade union, and academic and political members are duly
represented before a "gender focus" is added at the end.130
using the email account colombiamigra@freelist.org and is administered by
William Mejia (Alma Mater). An average of 30 emails containing important
information on new research, presentations, or events circulate on the network
each week. The most impressive aspect of the network is the intense sense of
commitment and cooperation among participants. As of May 18, the network
had 193 members working in the field of migration. Each piece of research is
continuously monitored and feedback is provided by the network members to
collaborate all that is required is a simple email. Most impressive is that the
network also includes (on an individual basis) most of the officials who work on
migration in the national government and the district of BogotA. During the
period, I was in contact with the network and received three emails from Johana
Sienz (an advisor at Colombia Nos Une) and Silvana Moncada (of the
Department of External Relationships in Bogotd's District Government) in
which they shared government policy documents and terms of reference for new
contracts in the field of migration.
130 Focus group on migration conducted with members of civil society (May 5,
2010). (In October 2009, the Plataforma opened its doors to feminist
organizations. During the first interview with Oscar G6mez, he clearly
acknowledged the initial reticence of the network to agree to this expansion for
reasons of "political correctness." According to G6mez, the introduction of
feminist thinking made it harder to achieve consensus. In spite of these views
expressed by the leader of the Plataforma (who handed over a few months ago to
Nidia Tarazona of the CGT), William Mejia of Alma Mater encouraged
participation by a varied group of feminist NGOs that work in the field of
migration, such as SISMA Mujer, Humanas, Iniciativa de Mujeres por la Paz
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It is here that the complementary relationship between civil
society agents and government agencies is apparent. The civil
society agents act in "replacement," or to "integrate" or "perfect"
the role of the state bodies responsible for promoting protection
frameworks for the population; they do this by engaging in direct
transactions where they receive resources in exchange for
providing exclusive knowledge. 3 1 Civil society agents involved in
complex organizations like the Plataforma take on the role of
collaborators in government policy in an ambivalent relationship
that presents them as "guardians of the rights of the defenseless"
and "representatives and experts on their situation."1 32 The second
relationship, then, involves a peaceful alternative that illustrates the
dichotomy between the state and civil society as producer of
agreements that are functional to both parties.
However, the findings that emerged from the case study
concerning the role of the NGOs are entirely pessimistic.
According to a first report prepared by the Colombian Federation
of NGOs (FEPEC) for Amnesty International, the 1991
Constitution ushered in a significant increase in the number of
NGOs operating as "social enterprises" and assumed the role of
channeling the interests of civil society, at the expense of other

and Manos Amigas. The contributions made by these organizations during the
short period they have been involved has included not only the contacts and
strategic alliances with certain members of Congress, but their powerful critique
of the structure of the draft law. Concretely, the women's organizations have
emphasized in particular that the focus on rights-which underlies the
conceptualization of the law-and a gender focus are not necessarily
compatible. They requested that the project should explicitly mention the need
to articulate government migration policy with a differential focus on rights that
not only recognized the particular vulnerability of women but led to affirmative
actions designed to protect and empower subjects who experience a double
marginalization: as women and as migrants).
131 See Gideon, supranote 35.
132

d
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structures. 133 These interests included creating political parties and
initiating movements. The aspirational nature of the 1991
Constitution created a visible breach between the "society that
should exist" and the society that "does exist."' 34 A perfect
opportunity was created for private interests, represented by
NGOs, to occupy the resulting vacuum. The process of litigating in
this space, of "forcing the state to fulfill its duties" as the NGOs
have, involves profound efforts disguised as attempts to formulate
"integral government policy," to seize the state bureaucracy.135
During the case study, the proposal to create the National
Migration Council was mediated by the successful experiences of
the Plataforma in its dealings with Bogotd's district government.' 36
This set precedent in two respects, namely political mediation and
the capture of government resources.1 37 Both of these were very
distant from the objectives of redistributing resources and
protecting the migrant population.
133 Margarita

Fl6rez, Non-Governmental Organizations and Philanthropy: The

Colombian Case, 8 Voluntas: INT'L JOURNAL OF VOLUNTARY AND NONPROFIT

ORGS. 386, 386-400 (1997).
134 Id. at 387.
135id.
36 See

id. (showing that this experiment provides a clear illustration of the way
NGOs work as private captors of government resources and evidence of what
has been called the "new cooptation" of the state by NGOs acting as new
political parties, or the NGOisation of the state).
37 See E.C. Pasour, Jr., Rent Seeking: Some Conceptual Problems and
Implications, 1 THE REV. OF AUSTRIAN EcON. 123, 123-42 (1983), available at
http://mises.org/journals/rae/pdf/rael_1_8.pdf
(using the term political
mediationto denote transactions by which civil society agents exchange political
support for government resources. In this sense, a transaction that involves an
exchange of votesfor bureaucratic advantage is a typical mechanism used in the
capture of resources. The idea of resource-capture is related to the search for
resources that results when an individual, organization, or business seeks to
generate income by manipulating or exploiting political structures or economic
environments other than through transactions within the real sector of the
economy that generate value added or productive wealth. Most research
regarding the search for resources concentrates on efforts to capture a monopoly
over special privileges such as government regulation, reduction in competition
or exclusivity deals).
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In general, the process by which the Plataforma captures
resources operates in two ways.' 38 It operates first, by designing a
specialized bureaucracy and second, through the reform of the
budgetary system. 13 9 This strategy is combined with a proposal for
a "strategy for the design of government policy" involving the
"mapping, survey, and analysis of the migrant population for
which the Colombian state has responsibility, and the development
of plans for their return."1 40 All these activities require a major
investment of the state's human resources, which inevitably, leads
to a demand for employees versed in the area.
This understanding of the situation may be combined with
others, especially the creation of the informal network of
researchers mentioned in the previous section along with the
investment of financial and human resources in the construction of
networks. These factors have had distorting effects on a world
inhabited by researchers and others knowledgeable on the subject.
To some extent, the supply of individuals with technical
knowledge of the topic is co-opted, controlled, and operated by the
members of the network to such a degree that many of the
bureaucratic transactions, which are not rooted politically in any
other way, occur within its confines. The control of the individual
researchers involves their positioning within a clear hierarchy
structured according to their degree of "commitment to the work of
the network," while the proposal to create the National System for
Migration may be seen as the creation of a set of bureaucratic

structures that enable the direct capture of governmental resources
earmarked to pay for jobs, consultancy contracts, advisors, and
surveys. 141 As one participant in the Migration NGOs Focus Group
said:

138See
139
140

141

L. 070/09, supra note 97.

d
d

Focus group on migration conducted with members of civil society (May 5,

2010).
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It is clear that the opinion at this table is determined by the
participation of the NGO in the public contracts. It is clear
also that Plataforma have known how to position its
members in the local government. I was so surprised when
an old member of Plataforma responded to my calls and
answered my question from the Foreign Affairs Direction
of Bogota D.C., now with the government and an official
member of the bureaucratic staff. Bravo! 142
In this way the "management of resources," a euphemism
that is constantly used by members of the network, is intimately
associated with an insistence on bureaucratic penetration. 143 The
anxiety to "be in government" does not merely involve the need
for representation, but is explicitly intended to create "contracting
niches" through which it becomes possible to benefit from the
government resources available at national and regional levels.144
However, the establishment of specialized bureaucratic
networks is not merely associated with the capture of government
resources; it also involves the construction of complex power
structures that, according to authors such as Lipsky, illustrates the
flip side of a government agency. The discretionary decisionmaking power of the bureaucracy also constitutes an important
source of power and authority, asserting a powerful influence on
everyday life. In more than one sense, bureaucrats may be
considered a powerful elite that makes decisions affecting the way
the population relates to government; meaning, the concentration
of bureaucratic power is significant.145
Another aspect of the approach focuses on the content of
government policy, taking into account the following interests: (a)
strengthening the state as distributor of rights; (b) prioritizing work
at the national level; (c) strengthening the right not to migrate; and
142

d

143

See E.C. Pasour, Jr., supra note 137.

144

id

145 MICHEL

LIPSKY,

STREET-LEVEL

INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES,

BUREAUCRATS:

DILEMMAS

13-18 (Russell Sage Found. 2010).
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(d) ensuring that the majority of objectives contained in the policy
focus on the return of migrants. 146 Bearing in mind that these
organizations have almost no communication with migrants
residing abroad or at the grassroots level, it is possible to draw the
following conclusion: the decision to concentrate on the domestic
arena reduces the amount to be scoured for resources and finances,
placing this in the hands of governmental bureaucracies and
making the task easier, since these sources are extremely diffuse in
the international sphere. It may be argued that it is indeed
beneficial to "work with the state," since it guarantees the
existence of the network as an informal structure and maintains its
members economically. This can only be justified, however, if the
"right not to migrate" and the "right to return" satisfy the real
interests of the migrant population. 147 On the other hand, work to
facilitate return and to prevent migration does produce a
considerable amount of state resources in Colombia, with their due
correlations in bureaucratic and budgetary terms. I interpret this
strategy as the capture of political structures to ensure the nonproductive appropriation of state resources originally intended to
benefit the migrant population.
This approach illustrates the capture relationship, which
involves an appropriation of the topic of migration by public and
private agencies.148 This relationship does not affect production in
See L. 070/09, PLATAFORMA SOCIAL MIGARTORIA HERMES (Colom.).
147 Luis GUARNIZO, MIGRACIONES, GLOBALIZACION Y SOCIEDAD: TEORIAS
Y TENDENCIAS EN EL SIGLO XX, in GERARDO ARDILA (ED.) COLOMBIA:
146

MIGRACIONES,
TRANSNACIONALISMO
Y
UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL (2006). (Guarnizo

DESPLAZAMIENTO,

BOGOTA:

defines this class of population
using three parameters: cross-border mobilization; rootedness and acceptance;
and cultural hybridity in the place of reception. This approach differentiates
between mobilization and internal displacement, which is not characterized by
any of these three attributes. Guarnizo's conceptual approach which is,
incidentally, the most commonly cited in works on the topic produced in
Colombia-does not argue that migrants wish to "generate" their return or to
"enjoy the right not to migrate").
148 See generally Gideon, supra note
35.
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the same way as the previous one, which promotes functional
alliances within the field of migration. However, it does illustrate
how government policy-making creates scenarios for fierce
competition between different vested interests. 149 Relationships of
capture are not only rooted in the excisions and divergences that
characterize the scenarios of negotiation and the relations between
government and civil society agents (who present themselves as
actors positioned to capture public resources). They also illustrate
how to define actors who have been trained to compete in and
colonize spaces where the mechanisms by which rights will be
distributed occupy the oppositional space with all their associated
material benefits. Relationships of capture exemplify the conflicts
between the public and the private, as both the elites of the state
bureaucracy and the private elites responsible for organizing and
representing civil society compete for the same state resources.
Thus, the capture relationship is also a manifestation of the
statement proposed by Gideon, Mawdsley, and Anheier regarding
NGO bureaucratization and quasi-governmental structures, which I
have described in the literature review section, and addresses the
resemblance between NGOs and the state in terms of
organizational features. 150
C. NGOs and Migrants: The Impersonation
Relationship
An alternative aspect that reinforces this characterization
of NGOs is the private networks, or "elites," established to capture
the resources derived from NGOs' use of the language of rights.
This is important due to the unrepresentative nature of the relations
between the "bureaucratic structures" and the subjects of
protection. The relationship between the Fundaci6n Esperanza,
Plataforma and the affected population is precarious; their
149 MARCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROuPs 2, 11, 13 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1971).
(indicating that no collective action exists without a set of selective interests that
move the individual members of the group).
150 See generallyGideon, supra note 35; Mawdsley et al., supranote 30.
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activities are based on a fictitious process involving the "creation
of the subject of protection."' One of the most surprising findings
of the focus groups regarding the NGOs was the prevalence of
mutual
accusations
concerning
"the
low
levels
of
52
representativeness" of their colleagues' work.1 During the focus
group on May 5, Liliana Chaparro of SISMA Mujer directly
accused the Fundaci6n Esperanza-and indeed all the NGOs
around the table-of being:
just an elite working for others but really just looking out
for yourselves . . . in the final analysis it's not working for

others, it's working to look after ourselves. We have to
recognize it . . . we are just an elite . . . we are just an
elite. 1
Several attempts have been made to "understand" the
population that the NGOs and networks are working for, the latest
being the First National Survey into International Migration and
Remittances,1 54 a national initiative coordinated by the Alma Mater
Focus group on migration conducted with members of civil society
(May 5,
2010).
152 id
151

153

154

Id.

See Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota, Resultados Generales de Migraciones

Internacionales y Remesas, ENCUESTA NACIONAL 2008 2009; Observatorio
Colombiano de Migraciones, PRIMERA EDIC1ON (Aug. 2009). The Primera

Encuesta de Migracidn Internacional y Remesas ENMIR 2008 2009. The
survey was carried out in 18 cities across Colombia, chosen because of the high
percentage of the population living in the exterior (62% of total households with
a family member living abroad, in 2005, according to official figures from the
national statistical department, DANE). According to the survey's editors, the
results provided an up to date overview of the dynamics of Colombian migration
and, in particular, of those households that have experienced migration, the
social and family contexts of migrants, profiles of emigrants and returnees, the
causes or motivations of the population flows and their effect, as indicated by
remittances. In terms of statistical representativeness, four major geographical
regions were covered by the survey: the North, Centre/West, Antioquia and the
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network. The results were to be sold to the Foreign Ministry, which
refused to accept the document, criticizing it for "serious
misrepresentations" caused by the "grave discrepancy between the
calculation of remittances and the sourced information on the
numbers of immigrants."155 Thus, during the presentation of the
National Migration Survey results at the "Civil Society Training
Workshop on Good Practice in Migration Policy" organized by the
Comisi6n Andina de Juristas on April 30, 2010, Jairo Muftoz,
Director of the Servicio Colombiano de Migraciones at the
Fundaci6n Esperanza, noted how difficult it had been to conduct
the survey:
We are faced with a subject whose life circumstances are
linked with their success in achieving social mimesis: in
not-appearing. Neither the families, nor the social centers,
nor places of reception, such as the Colombian
neighborhoods in Madrid, New York, Paris, or Barcelona
provide spaces where migrants feel comfortable talking.
Why they migrate, what they are seeking, why they send
remittances and what expectations they have of return are
questions to which it is still not possible to get a precise
answer capable of being generalized to cover a population
that, by definition, does not wish to be seen.156
Immigrants cannot let themselves be known because their
success relies in part on their strategic invisibility and social
Coffee Belt and Vale de Cauca and BogotA. See Alcaldia Mayor de Bogot6,
Encuesta Nacional 2008-2009, Resultados Generales de Migraciones
Internacionales y Remesas, Observatorio Distrital de Migraciones (Secretaria
General- Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota D.C.) and Observatorio Colombiano de
Migraciones (Fundaci6n Esperanza- Red Alma Mater), Primera Edici6n: Agosto
de 2009.
155 Interview Ximena Botero, Dir., Colombia nos Une [Unitedby Colombia], in
COLOM. (Mar. 23, 2010).
156 Jairo Mufloz, Dir., Servicio Colombiano de Migraciones at Fundaci6n
Esperanza, Remarks at the Workshop for Public Officials and Civil Society:
Good Practice in International Migration Policy (Apr. 30, 2010).

2012-2013

The NGO-isation Dilemma

111

mimesis, factors that have made it impossible for these
organizations to gain "knowledge" of the victims.1 57 However, this
invisibility has not limited their ability to engage in their "task;"
the NGOs have "invented the figure of the migrant population,"
deciding that it needs a "National Council in order to generate
domestic government policy, strengthen return plans and reinvest
the remittances that migrants send home, for the development of
the country by strengthening the framework of rights." 58
It is interesting to note how accusations concerning the lack
of representativeness are common in the internal discussions of the
NGOs. To question the "representativeness" or "grass roots work"
is to employ a powerful and emotional weapon, and the accusation
is never well-received. Interested NGOs always have preestablished scripts that they use to illustrate some "nugget of
wisdom" intended to simulate an intention to facilitate contact with
the subjects of protection and legitimize their position as true
spokespersons for their interests.1 59 A related strategy is the
training of NGO leaders in the elaboration of discourses couched
in the third person: "migrants think . . . migrants feel . . . migrants
want . . . ." Implicit in these discourses is the idea that "they

possess" the voice of the migrant. Despite this, however, in spaces
involving various NGOs, where some are allies and others are
competitors within a single protection scenario, a silent conspiracy
is likely to emerge. In reality, none of the NGOs work with the
victims, know what they want, or represent them. As Olson
maintains, from a group theory perspective, the work of NGOs
provides evidence of the difficulty of collective action in a system
constructed on premises of rationality and the ego. 160
157

id

15s See generally William Mejia and Diana Ramirez, Documento de Base para
Iniciaci6n la Discusidny Definici6n de una Politica Distrital en el Tema de
Migraciones Internacionales (Sept. 28, 2009) (unpublished research) (on file
with author).
159 See Focus group, supra note
151.
16See Olson, supra note 149, at 44.
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There is, then, a concrete power relation surrounding the
question of who "represents the other."' 6 1 The vacuum created by
the existence of the migrant generates a powerful tension between
the right to "say it" and the right to "define it." Nevertheless, these
efforts to represent and define the other carry within them a harsh
exercise in domination, in the creation of "subalternity," which
distances the NGOs from their original aim of providing support
and protection.162 In their desire to "understand," the NGOs use
technical tools that speak of otherness: they survey, interview,
locate using geo-referencing, define, model, characterize, and
classify the migrant.163 The approach of these organizations to the
other, and their brusque exercise of domination remains a topic for
further study.164
This situation configures
the third relationship
characterizing the civil society actors studied here: impersonation
of the migrant population and its role in the definition of migrants
as the "other." As I stated previously, in addition to a relationship
of instrumentalization,complementarity, and capture, civil society
agents generate an impersonation relationshipwith governmental
structures concerning the "representation" and "definition" of the
"other," "who has the voice" of the victims of the migratory

1 See generally Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak? in
COLONIAL DISCOURSE AND POSTCOLONIAL THEORY: A READER 66, 89 (Patrick

Williams & Laura Chrisman eds., 1994)
162Gideon, supra note 35, at
13-17.
163 There have been a considerable number of attempts
to define and classify
migrants; all employ dichotomous structures that highlight the subordination of
one of the two parties involved: regular/irregular, legal/illegal, refugee/worker,
student/prostitute, visitor/displaced. See Oscar G6mez Diez, Del Olvido a la
Inclusidn: Elementos para una Politica Migratoria Desde un Enfoque de
Derechos Humanos, 1 REVISTA DIALOGOS MIGRANTES 10 (2008), available at
http://observatoriodemigraciones.org/apc-aa-files/69e3909999fd8ec8018dd3f5d
7dbdc5d/DMigrantes No.1 .pdf.
164 See generally Spivak, supra note 161 (discussing "the Other" as a tool of
oppression, the impossibility of speaking of the subaltern as a link in the chain
of production, and the "mediation of the intellectual" within the mechanism of
domination).
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process. Jad and Relifeld, cited above, have addressed this
relationship. 165
Within the definition of otherness produced by the
Plataforma, the profile of migrants has three characteristics: (1)
their rights require protection because they are "sub-citizens" in
the receptor country; (2) they are economically productive (i.e.
they send remittances home, and they are motivated to migrate for
economic reasons); and (3) they occupy a marginal position
between the irregular and the illegal (for the Plataforma, a "legal"
migrant, such as a student, a business person, an adventurer or
tourist, does not require protection).
In contrast, the conceptual apparatus employed by the
government to approach the question of migration is organized
around the twin focuses of its voluntary nature and necessity.166 if
migrations are voluntary, the adopted analytical framework comes
from economics. If the migrations are involuntary, the applicable
discourse is International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The Foreign
Ministry's program on migration is aligned with overall foreign
policy and the government's insistence that no internal armed
conflict exists. 167 Therefore, the program created to work with
refugees (Mi casa en Colombia or "My home in Colombia")
enjoys only one sixth of the budget assigned to work with
migratory flows through the Colombia Nos Une program and is,
furthermore, designed only to attend to people who are refugees in
Colombia, not Colombians who have sought refuge abroad as a
result of the internal political conflict.' 6 8 Similarly, the Colombia
Nos Une program adopts a notion of the migrant's otherness that

165Jad, supra note

18, at 622; Rehfeld, supra note 22.
Interview with Roberto Vidal, member of Plataforma Social Hermes and
Assoc. Professor at Universidad Javeriana (Apr. 23, 2010).
167 Interview with Ximena Botero, Dir., Colom. nos Une [United
for Colom.], in
Agency of Foreign Affairs in Colom. (Mar. 23, 2010).
6 Informe de la Cancilleriaa la ContraloriaGeneralde la Naci6n,
June 2009.
166
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does not incorporate the concept of necessity.169 All migrants are
voluntary and productive and only in exceptional cases irregular
(or illegal). 170 The definition used in official policy emphasizes the
management of remittances, meaning it adopts an economic model
and avoids the question of how to deal with labor migration. 7 1
Hence, the last relation concerns the lack of representation
and social base of the Migration NGOs in Colombia. Authors like
Jad and Gideon have suggested that NGOs are no longer linked
with their grassroots past and are currently de-legitimized.1 72 The
migrant population is a perfect example of how NGOs can speak
on behalf someone without ever knowing her/him. As the evidence
suggests, there is not a strong relationship between the Migration
NGOs and the migrants in the international context, nor is there a
representation relationship between them. This leads me to suggest
that Migration NGOs have a strong challenge in terms of
accountability not only with their donors and states, but also with
their own beneficiaries.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper began with a series of questions: Are NGOs
successful mediators between government decision-makers and
civil society? Is it wrong to accuse them of being bureaucratic and
motivated by the capture of funds? Why should it be such a
surprise that they neither "represent" the migrant population nor
have a social base? Do the migrants even know what they want?
Why should NGOs not operate as networks or elites that seek
simply to maximize their own benefit? Throughout this article, I
Interview with Ximena Botero, Dir., Colom. nos Une [United for Colom.], in
Agency of Foreign Affairs in Colom. (Mar. 23, 2010).
170 Informe de la Cancilleriaa la ContraloriaGeneralde la Naci6n, June 2009.
71
1 The constant accusation made against the Foreign Ministry by the Plataforma,
which appeared in the planning document CONPES 3603 of 2009, concerns
the imposition of an "economistic" view consisting of attempts to collect the
highest percentages possible of the resources that enter the country in the form
of remittances. See Ministerio del Interior, supranote 1.
172 See Gideon, supra note
35.
169
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have attempted to address these questions and raise the issues
resulting from them.
The conclusion to draw from this research is that there are
at least three ways of highlighting the relationships between
Migration NGOs and the actors involved in the field of migration:
(1) international cooperation agencies; (2) local government; and
(3) migrants. These relationships include instrumentalization
(between NGOs and international cooperation), complementarity
and capture (between NGOs and local government), and
impersonation (between NGOs and migrants).
The case study shows that the role of the NGO is highly
variable in terms of outcomes, an issue that also challenges the
current accountability mechanism designed to assess these
organizations. Thus, while the relationship between migrants and
Migration NGOs results in problems of representation, public
agencies present networks, like the Plataforma, as complementary
to the role of state agencies and offer successful experiences of
civil society organization. At the same time, the capture
relationship created between NGOs and local government
illustrates the struggle that exists for the distribution of (scarce)
public resources, as well as dynamics of co-optation and
confrontation. Finally, the instrumental relationship contextualizes
the relations of complementary, capture, and impersonation at the
local level within a global scenario of domination, wherein the
game played involving rights and migrants is molded by the

overall distribution of resources between the center and the
periphery. The inevitable result is always the North, favored by
new currents of international cooperation.
Employing this perspective, then, this case study finds the
following to be true in the field of Migration NGOs' accountability.
First, Migration NGOs have developed new ways of working,
including institutionalized structures and strategies of cooperation and
alliances that aspire to levels of formality and specialization in the
development of bureaucratic objectives. The NGOs are perceived as
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"elites" and as "the new political parties." 173 This has nothing to do
with the NGOs' statuses as organizations that are independent of local
governments. On the contrary, the NGOs' new objectives are
suspiciously designed to influence and capture these levels of
government. Thus, as the literature recognizes, NGOs display
bureaucratization characteristics and quasi-governmental structures.1 74
Second, there is a visible devaluation of the Migration
NGOs in their role as mechanisms for representing civil society
and facilitating connections and/or communication between civil
society and the decision-making bodies in Congress, the
government, and the legal system. Migration NGOs are
increasingly distant from their social bases and ever closer to the
entrepreneurial structures that characterize political action within
the establishment.
Finally, important levels of articulation exist between
NGOs and the international cooperation regarding funding in the
global spectrum. Decreasing international labor migration
deployed to migration receptor countries helps to establish the
analytical connection between an international cooperation agenda
and the NGOs' insistence that the state should be strengthened.
According to this perspective, the NGOs serve to reproduce
postcolonial realities while helping to promote international
cooperation agendas.
Raising NGO accountability questions is important because
they are key actors in the social arena. These entities have become
much more effective than states as global players, especially
economically dependent states because they are not state-based and
are also not held accountable. In the migration field, specifically,
the accountability issue of the Migration NGOs and their lack of
representation in the migrant population challenge the state and the
civil society actors, in terms of inquiry development. I hope my
work will contribute to this social inquiry.

173See
174

Focus group, supra note 151.
Mawdsley et al., supra note 30.

